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Introduction
In this paper we consider a generalization of the fixed tree problem, introduced by Megiddo (1978) . In a fixed tree problem a rooted tree Γ and a set of agents N is given, each agent being located at precisely one vertex of Γ and each vertex containing precisely one agent. Megiddo (1978) associates with such a problem a cooperative cost game (N, c), a fixed tree game, where, for every coalition S ⊆ N , c(S) denotes the minimal cost needed to connect all members of S to the root via a subtree of Γ.
Fixed tree games and variants of fixed tree games have also been studied in Galil (1980) , Maschler et al. (1995) , Granot et al. (1996) , Koster (1999) , Van Gellekom (2000) and Koster et al. (2001) . The special case where the tree is a chain corresponds to airport games, which have been considered in Littlechild (1974) , Littlechild and Owen (1977) (1977) . Variants of fixed tree games, where it is allowed that one vertex is occupied by more players or by no player, are considered in e.g. Koster (1999) and Van Gellekom (2000) . However, in these variants it is still required that every player occurs in precisely one vertex. In this paper we generalize the model of Megiddo (1978) in the sense that players may occur repeatedly, i.e. in more than one vertex of the given tree. As a motivation for this generalized model one can consider for example the following irrigation problem. Consider a set of parcels in a desert environment which need to be irrigated from a well. For that reason, a network has been designed which allows the transportation of water from the well to at least one of the corners of each parcel. Consider, for example, the situation with eight parcels in Bold lines indicate the network that has already been constructed. The players are facing the problem of dividing the maintenance costs of this network, so they are facing a fixed tree problem where the tree is as depicted in Figure 2 .
With this fixed tree we can associate in a natural way a cooperative cost game (N, c). For every coalition S ⊆ N the number c(S) denotes the minimal cost needed to connect all members of S at least once to the root via a subtree. This leads to the class of fixed tree games with repeated players.
Standard fixed tree games and the variants of these games are known to be concave. We will show that this needs not be true for fixed tree games with repeated players. However, we will show that these games are balanced, by showing that the core of a fixed tree game with repeated players coincides with the core of some related standard fixed tree game. Moreover, we analyze which marginal vectors provide core elements. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we recall some notions from graph theory and cooperative game theory. In Section 3 we formally introduce fixed tree games with repeated players and in Section 4 we focus on the structure of the core of these games. 
Preliminaries
In this section we recall some notions of graph theory and cooperative game theory.
A tree Γ = (V, E) is an undirected connected graph without cycles, with set of vertices V and set of edges E. The set V contains a vertex which has a special meaning. We denote this vertex by 0 and refer to it as the root. For each vertex v ∈ V there is a unique path from the root to vertex v, which we denote by P (v).
The precedence relation (V, ) on V is defined by v v if and only if v ∈ P (v ). Analogously we define the precedence relation (E, ) on the set of edges. A trunk of (V, E) is a set of vertices T ⊆ V containing the root which is closed under the precedence relation (V, ), i.e. if v ∈ T and v v, then v ∈ T . Hence, the subtree corresponding to this set of vertices T is connected. The set of followers of a vertex v is the set F (v) = {v ∈ V |v v }. A vertex v is called a leaf if F (v) = {v}. Analogously we define the set of edges F (e) following an edge e. Note that it holds that e ∈ F (e).
A cooperative (cost) game is a tuple (N, c) where N = {1, 2, ..., n} is the set of players, and c : 2 N → R is its characteristic (cost) function, in which, c(S) is interpreted as the total cost of coalition S. By convention, c(∅) = 0.
The core of a cost game (N, c) is the set
If x ∈ C(c), then no coalition S ⊆ N has an incentive to split off from the grand coalition N if x is the proposed vector of cost shares. A game (N, c) is called balanced if it has a nonempty core and totally balanced if the core of every subgame is nonempty, where the subgame corresponding to some coalition T ⊆ N , T = ∅, is the game (T, c T ) with c T (S) = c(S) for all S ⊆ T . An order on the players is a bijection θ : N → {1, . . . , n}, where θ(i) = j means that player i is at position j. For every order θ : N → {1, . . . , n} we define the marginal vector m θ (c) by
A game (N, c) is called monotone if for every S, T ∈ 2 N with S ⊆ T , we have c(S) ≤ c(T ). Moreover, for a balanced monotonic game (N, c) it holds that x i ≥ 0 for every x ∈ C(c).
A game (N, c) is concave if for every i ∈ N and every S ⊆ T ⊆ N \{i}, we have c(S ∪ {i}) − c(S) ≥ c(T ∪ {i}) − c(T ). Hence, for concave games the marginal contribution of a player to any coalition is larger than his marginal contribution to a larger coalition. It is a well known result that a cost game is concave if and only if all marginal vectors are core elements (cf. Shapley (1971) and Ichiishi (1981) ). Hence, concave cost games are balanced.
Model and game
In this section we introduce fixed tree problems with repeated players and its associated cooperative games. 5. a(e) > 0 is, for every edge e ∈ E, the cost associated with edge e; which satisfies the following assumptions (A1) for every i ∈ N there is a v ∈ V with i ∈ S(v); (A2) for each leaf t ∈ V , there is an i ∈ N such that i ∈ S(t) and i / ∈ S(v) for every v ∈ V \{t}.
Assumption (A1) states that every player should occupy at least one vertex in the tree. Assumption (A2) states that the tree (V, E) is "optimal" for the grand coalition N , in the sense that no proper subtree of (V, E) provides at least one connection with the root for every i ∈ N .
Players who occupy at least two vertices are called repeated players. Players who occupy precisely one vertex are called essential players. If an FRP problem does not have repeated players, then it is called a standard FRP. Example 1. In Figure 3 two cost sharing problems are depicted. We can easily see that the tree on the left does not correspond to an FRP problem because after removing one of the edges, all three players remain connected to the root. Hence, Assumption (A2) is violated.
The tree on the right, on the contrary, corresponds to an FRP problem. It has three leaves and each of them is occupied by one essential player. Nevertheless, this is not a standard tree problem as defined in Megiddo (1978) since each of the players 1, 2 and 3 is located in more than one vertex.
For an FRP problem we can define a corresponding cost game.
Definition 2. Let Γ = (N, (V, E), 0, (S(v)) v∈V , (a(e)) e∈E ) be an FRP problem. The corresponding fixed tree game with repeated players, FRP game for short, is the cost game (N, c) defined by c(S) = min
where A S is the collection of admissible subtrees for coalition S. A subtree is admissible for coalition S ⊆ N if it provides at least one connection with the root for every i ∈ S.
In the following example we illustrate the concepts of FRP games and admissible trees. From the definition of FRP games it easily follows that FRP games are monotonic games since for every S ⊆ T ⊆ N , we have A S ⊇ A T .
Note that in the tree on the right depicted in Figure 3 , the position of player 1 in the vertex with player 5 seems irrelevant since the path from the root to this vertex contains another vertex occupied by player 1. We formalize this idea below.
Given an FRP problem
we define the reduced problem
That is, from the set of players occupying vertex v, those which also occupy a preceding vertex are dropped. Observe that the essential players remain in their initial vertex. The cost game associated with the reduced problem will be denoted by (N, c red ). This reduction is illustrated in Example 3. Example 3. In Figure 5 an FRP problem Γ is depicted and its corresponding reduced problem Γ red . In the first tree, player 7 is located in four different vertices. So player 7 can choose among four different paths to be connected to the root. However, the path that ends in the vertex occupied by players 6 and 7 is part of the path that ends in the vertex occupied by players 2, 6 and 7. Therefore player 7 will never choose this second path to connect himself to the root, since this path yields a higher cost. Therefore we can delete player 7 from the vertex occupied by players 2, 6 and 7 without changing the game.
Proceeding in this way we obtain the reduced problem Γ red which is depicted in the second tree of Figure 5 .
The proof of the following proposition is straightforward and therefore omitted. Henceforth we assume in the sequel of this paper, without loss of generality, that an FRP problem is reduced.
The core
In this section we show that FRP games are balanced and we focus on the structure of the core.
Standard fixed tree games are known to be concave. Hence, it follows that these games are balanced. The following example illustrates that this argument can not be used for FRP games, since these games need not be totally balanced, and therefore not concave.
Example 4. Let (N, c) be the FRP game obtained from the second FRP problem depicted in Figure 3 . The characteristic function of the subgame restricted to coalition {1, 2, 3} is the following
Now suppose that C(c {1,2,3} ) = ∅. Then there is an x ∈ C(c {1,2,3} ). It follows that x 1 + x 2 ≤ c {1,2,3} ({1, 2}) = 3. Similarly we have that x 1 + x 3 ≤ c {1,2,3} ({1, 3}) = 5 and x 2 + x 3 ≤ c {1,2,3} ({2, 3}) = 6. Adding these three expressions yields 2(x 1 + x 2 + x 3 ) ≤ 14, or equivalently x 1 + x 2 + x 3 ≤ 7. However, since x ∈ C(c {1,2,3} ) it holds that x 1 + x 2 + x 3 = 8. Because of this contradiction we conclude that C(c {1,2,3} ) = ∅, and therefore that (N, c) is not totally balanced.
Next we will show that FRP games have a nonempty core. In order to do so we will show that the core of an FRP game coincides with the core of a related standard FRP game. Since this standard FRP game is concave and thus balanced, we then conclude that FRP games are balanced as well.
Consider the FRP problem Γ = (N, (V, E), 0, (S(v)) v∈V , (a(e)) e∈E ). We obtain the related standard FRP problem Γ st by relocating the repeated players. In particular, each repeated player gets relocated to precisely one vertex. This new situation is defined by the 5-tuple
whereS(v) is obtained from S(v) as follows. If player i ∈ N is a repeated player in Γ, then there is more than one path connecting him with the root. Since (V, E) is a tree, the common part of all these paths is again a path. Let v * ∈ V be the furthest vertex from the root on this common path, then in the new problem, player i is located only in vertex v * . If player i ∈ N is essential in Γ then in Γ st this player remains in the same vertex. That is, if i is an essential player in Γ and i ∈ S(v), then i ∈S(v).
In the following example the construction of Γ st is illustrated.
Example 5. Consider the FRP problem Γ corresponding to the tree depicted in Figure 6 . From Γ we obtain Γ st by changing only the position of the repeated players. For example player 4 can choose between two paths in order to be connected to the root. The intersection of these two paths is the path which contains the root and the vertex occupied by player 6. In Γ st , player 4 occupies the furthest vertex from the root on this intersection path. Note that repeated players 4, 7 and 9, also move to vertices which are closer to the root. Observe that player 7 is reallocated to the root. Meanwhile all essential players remain in the same vertex. Granot et al. (1996) show that standard fixed tree games are concave. The following proposition weakly generalizes this result and can be proved in a similar way. Therefore the proof is omitted.
Proposition 2. Cost games corresponding to standard FRP's are concave.
In the following theorem we show that the cores of the cost games corresponding to an FRP problem and its associated standard FRP problem coincide. Theorem 1. Let Γ = (N, (V, E), 0, (S(v)) v∈V , (a(e)) e∈E ) be an FRP problem and let Γ st = (N, (V, E), 0, (S(v)) v∈V , (a(e)) e∈E ) be the corresponding standard FRP problem. Let (N, c) and (N, c st ) be the corresponding cost games. Then it holds that C(c) = C(c st ).
Proof. First note that c st (S) ≤ c(S) for every S ⊆ N and c st (N ) = c(N ). As a consequence we get C(c st ) ⊆ C(c). Now we show that C(c) ⊆ C(c st ). Let x ∈ C(c). From the monotonicity of (N, c) it follows that x ≥ 0. We need to show that for every S ⊆ N it holds that x(S) ≤ c st (S), or equivalently that x(N \S) ≥ c(N ) − c st (S). Let S ⊂ N , and let V S be the set of vertices in which the members of S are located in the standard FRP problem, i.e. V S = {v ∈ V |S(v) ∩ S = ∅}. Let T S be the smallest trunk containing V S , and let E S be the subset of edges corresponding to this trunk. By definition of T S it holds that c st (S) = e∈E S a(e).
Now let O S denote the set of outgoing edges of T S , i.e. O S = {(i, j) ∈ E|i ∈ T S and j / ∈ T S }. Furthermore let, for all e ∈ O S , V e be the set of vertices corresponding to edges of F (e)\{e}. Finally, let I c e = v / ∈Ve
S(v)
and let I e = N \I c e . In other words, I e are those players which appear only in vertices of V e , and I c e is its complement. Because of assumption (A2) it follows that I e = ∅ for each e ∈ O S .
Let e ∈ O S . Since each member of I c e appears at least once in a vertex of V \V e , the edges in F (e) are not needed to connect the members of I c e to the root.
Hence, c(I
a(f ) and therefore
a(f ). From the efficiency of x we deduce that
Hence, the players which appear only in one branch of the tree pay the entire cost of that branch. If j ∈ S, then it follows that j ∈ I e for every e ∈ O S . Therefore,∪ e∈O S I e ⊂ N \S. By definition of I e it follows that I e ∩ Iē = ∅ for all e,ē ∈ O S , e =ē. That is, the I e 's are pairwise disjoint. Hence,
where the first inequality follows from (1), and the second from x ≥ 0. It also holds that
We conclude that
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of Theorem 1 and the fact that concave games have a nonempty core.
Corollary 1. The core of an FRP game is nonempty.
Theorem 1 also enables us to obtain the nucleolus of an FRP game. The nucleolus is a well known one-point solution concept introduced by Schmeidler (1969) . The nucleolus has the property that it is a core element whenever the core is nonempty. Potters and Tijs (1994) showed that if two games have the same core, with one of the games being concave, then both games have the same nucleolus as well. Hence, we conclude using Theorem 1 that the nucleolus of an FRP game coincides with the nucleolus of its associated standard FRP game. In Megiddo (1978) it is proved that the nucleolus of a fixed tree game can be computed within O(n 3 ) operations. Later on, Galil (1980) reduced the complexity of determining the nucleolus to O(n log n). Another algorithm, presented by Granot et al. (1996) , has a complexity of O(n 2 ), and in some trees only O(n). In Maschler et al. (1995) other algorithms are given, and also a painting story that shows monotonicity properties of the nucleolus in a fixed tree game.
The last part of this section is dedicated to marginal vectors. We will characterize the marginal vectors that are core elements. First we need some definitions.
Let Γ = (N, (V, E), 0, (S(v)) v∈V , (a(e)) e∈E ) be an FRP problem and Γ st = (N, (V, E), 0, (S(v)) v∈V , (a(e)) e∈E ) be the corresponding standard FRP problem. For every i ∈ N we define
Note that for every essential player we have i ∈ N i . A coalition S ⊆ N is called proper if for every i ∈ S there exists a player j ∈ S ∩ N i . These definitions are illustrated in Example 6.
Example 6. Consider the FRP problem Γ depicted in Figure 6 . Player 4 is a repeated player who appears in two different vertices, say v 1 and v 2 . Consider now these two vertices v 1 and v 2 in Γ st and the corresponding sets of vertices F (v 1 ) and F (v 2 ). The set of players located in these sets of vertices in Γ st is N 4 . More precisely, N 4 = {1, 8} ∪ {3, 9, 10, 5} = {1, 3, 5, 8, 9, 10}.
Consider now coalition S = {4, 6}. We can easily see that N 4 ∩ S = ∅. Therefore coalition S is not proper. On the contrary, coalition T = {1, 4, 6} is proper. Since, 1 and 6 are both essential it holds that 1 ∈ N 1 ∩ T and 6 ∈ N 6 ∩ T . It is also obvious that 1 ∈ N 4 ∩ T .
The following lemma states that proper coalitions have the same cost in the FRP game and in its associated standard FRP game, while non proper coalitions have a strictly larger cost in the FRP game than in its associated standard FRP game. Lemma 1. Let Γ = (N, (V, E), 0, (S(v)) v∈V , (a(e)) e∈E ) be an FRP problem and let Γ st = (N, (V, E), 0, (S(v)) v∈V , (a(e)) e∈E ) be the corresponding standard FRP problem. Let (N, c) and (N, c st ) be the corresponding cost games. Then the following holds:
Proof. Let S ⊆ N . Let T * be the optimal tree for S in Γ st and let V (T * ) be the vertex set corresponding to this tree. Since for every T ∈ A S (Γ) we have T * ⊆ T , it holds that c(S) ≥ c st (S). Moreover, c(S) = c st (S) if and only if T * ∈ A S (Γ). Hence we only need to prove that S is proper if and only if T * ∈ A S (Γ). First assume that S is proper. Let i ∈ S and let j ∈ N i ∩ S. There are v, v ∈ V with v ∈ F (v), i ∈ S(v) and j ∈S(v ). Since T * is optimal for S in Γ st and j ∈S(v ), it must hold that v ∈ V (T * ). Since v ∈ F (v) this implies that v ∈ V (T * ). We conclude that T * connects all i ∈ S to the root in Γ. Therefore we have that T * ∈ A S (Γ). To show the reverse, assume that T * ∈ A S (Γ). We want to show that S is proper. Let i ∈ S. Since T * is admissible for S in Γ there is a v ∈ V (T * ) with i ∈ S(v). Because T * is optimal for S in Γ st , there is a j ∈ S and a v ∈ V (T * ) with v ∈ F (v) and j ∈S(v ). Thus j ∈ S ∩ N i . Hence S is proper.
The next theorem characterizes those orders that provide marginal vectors that are core elements. Proof. Let (N, (V, E), 0, (S(v)) v∈V , (a(e)) e∈E ) be the associated standard FRP problem, and (N, c st ) its corresponding game. First we show the "if" part. Assume that θ : N → {1, . . . , n} is such that for every player i ∈ N there exists a player j ∈ N i such that θ(j) ≤ θ(i). Now let k ∈ N . By assumption it holds that for all i ∈ {l ∈ N |θ(l) ≤ θ(k)} there is a j ∈ N i with θ(j) ≤ θ(i). Hence, j ∈ {l ∈ N |θ(l) ≤ θ(k)} and we conclude that {l ∈ N |θ(l) ≤ θ(k)} is proper. This implies that for all S ⊆ N it holds that where the second equality follows by Lemma 1 and the fact that {l ∈ N |θ(l) ≤ θ(k)} and {l ∈ N |θ(l) < θ(k)} are proper, the first inequality by the concavity of (N, c st ) and the last inequality again by Lemma 1. As a result we have that m θ (c) ∈ C(c). Second we show the "only if" part. Assume θ : N → {1, . . . , n} is such that there exists a player i ∈ N such that for any j ∈ N i it holds that θ(j) > θ(i). Let i * be the first player in the order θ with this property. Consider now coalition S = {i ∈ N |θ(i) ≤ θ(i * )}. Then, by Lemma 1, c(S) > c st (S). Every extreme point of C(c st ) coincides with a marginal vector of (N, c st ). The following example shows that this need not hold for C(c), i.e. there are extreme points in C(c) that do not coincide with marginal vectors of (N, c). 
